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Mark Rasch: Lazy Workers May Be Deemed HackersLazy Workers May Be Deemed Hackers
>> Advertisement << Can you answer the ERP quiz? These 10 questions determine if your Enterprise RP rollout gets an A+. http://www.findtechinfo.com/as/acs?pl=781&ca=909 Categories: Security
Mark Rasch: Hacker-Tool Law Still Does LittleHacker-Tool Law Still Does Little
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Infocus: Enterprise Intrusion Analysis, Part OneEnterprise Intrusion Analysis, Part One
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Infocus: Responding to a Brute Force SSH AttackResponding to a Brute Force SSH Attack
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Infocus: Data Recovery on Linux and <i>ext3</i>Data Recovery on Linux and <i>ext3</i>
>> Advertisement << Can you answer the ERP quiz? These 10 questions determine if your Enterprise RP rollout gets an A+. http://www.findtechinfo.com/as/acs?pl=781&ca=909 Categories: Security
Infocus: WiMax: Just Another Security Challenge?WiMax: Just Another Security Challenge?
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TA18-201A: Emotet MalwareOriginal release date: July 20, 2018
Systems Affected Network Systems OverviewEmotet is an advanced, modular banking Trojan that primarily functions as a downloader or dropper of other banking Trojans. Emotet continues to be among the most costly and destructive malware affecting state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) governments, and the private and public sectors. This joint Technical Alert (TA) is the result of Multi-State Information Sharing & Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) analytic efforts, in coordination with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC). DescriptionEmotet continues to be among the most costly and destructive malware affecting SLTT governments. Its worm-like features result in rapidly spreading network-wide infection, which are difficult to combat. Emotet infections have cost SLTT governments up to $1 million per incident to remediate. Emotet is an advanced, modular banking Trojan that primarily functions as a downloader or dropper of other banking Trojans. Additionally, Emotet is a polymorphic banking Trojan that can evade typical signature-based detection. It has several methods for maintaining persistence, including auto-start registry keys and services. It uses modular Dynamic Link Libraries (DLLs) to continuously evolve and update its capabilities. Furthermore, Emotet is Virtual Machine-aware and can generate false indicators if run in a virtual environment. Emotet is disseminated through malspam (emails containing malicious attachments or links) that uses branding familiar to the recipient; it has even been spread using the MS-ISAC name. As of July 2018, the most recent campaigns imitate PayPal receipts, shipping notifications, or “past-due” invoices purportedly from MS-ISAC. Initial infection occurs when a user opens or clicks the malicious download link, PDF, or macro-enabled Microsoft Word document included in the malspam. Once downloaded, Emotet establishes persistence and attempts to propagate the local networks through incorporated spreader modules. Figure 1: Malicious email distributing EmotetCurrently, Emotet uses five known spreader modules: NetPass.exe, WebBrowserPassView, Mail PassView, Outlook scraper, and a credential enumerator.
To maintain persistence, Emotet injects code into explorer.exe and other running processes. It can also collect sensitive information, including system name, location, and operating system version, and connects to a remote command and control server (C2), usually through a generated 16-letter domain name that ends in “.eu.” Once Emotet establishes a connection with the C2, it reports a new infection, receives configuration data, downloads and runs files, receives instructions, and uploads data to the C2 server. Emotet artifacts are typically found in arbitrary paths located off of the AppData\Local and AppData\Roaming directories. The artifacts usually mimic the names of known executables. Persistence is typically maintained through Scheduled Tasks or via registry keys. Additionally, Emotet creates randomly-named files in the system root directories that are run as Windows services. When executed, these services attempt to propagate the malware to adjacent systems via accessible administrative shares. Note: it is essential that privileged accounts are not used to log in to compromised systems during remediation as this may accelerate the spread of the malware. Example Filenames and Paths: C:\Users\<username>\AppData \Local\Microsoft\Windows\shedaudio.exe C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Roaming\Macromedia\Flash Player\macromedia\bin\flashplayer.exe Typical Registry Keys: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run System Root Directories: C:\Windows\11987416.exe C:\Windows\System32\46615275.exe C:\Windows\System32\shedaudio.exe C:\Windows\SysWOW64\f9jwqSbS.exe ImpactNegative consequences of Emotet infection include
NCCIC and MS-ISAC recommend that organizations adhere to the following general best practices to limit the effect of Emotet and similar malspam:
If a user or organization believes they may be infected, NCCIC and MS-ISAC recommend running an antivirus scan on the system and taking action to isolate the infected workstation based on the results. If multiple workstations are infected, the following actions are recommended:
MS-ISAC is the focal point for cyber threat prevention, protection, response, and recovery for the nation’s SLTT governments. More information about this topic, as well as 24/7 cybersecurity assistance for SLTT governments, is available by phone at 866-787-4722, by email at SOC@cisecurity.org, or on MS-ISAC’s website at https://msisac.cisecurity.org/. To report an intrusion and request resources for incident response or technical assistance, contact NCCIC by email at NCCICCustomerService@hq.dhs.gov or by phone at 888-282-0870. References
This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy. Categories: Security
TA18-149A: HIDDEN COBRA – Joanap Backdoor Trojan and Brambul Server Message Block WormOriginal release date: May 29, 2018 | Last revised: May 31, 2018
Systems Affected Network systems OverviewThis joint Technical Alert (TA) is the result of analytic efforts between the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Working with U.S. government partners, DHS and FBI identified Internet Protocol (IP) addresses and other indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with two families of malware used by the North Korean government:
The U.S. Government refers to malicious cyber activity by the North Korean government as HIDDEN COBRA. For more information on HIDDEN COBRA activity, visit https://www.us-cert.gov/hiddencobra. FBI has high confidence that HIDDEN COBRA actors are using the IP addresses—listed in this report’s IOC files—to maintain a presence on victims’ networks and enable network exploitation. DHS and FBI are distributing these IP addresses and other IOCs to enable network defense and reduce exposure to any North Korean government malicious cyber activity. This alert also includes suggested response actions to the IOCs provided, recommended mitigation techniques, and information on how to report incidents. If users or administrators detect activity associated with these malware families, they should immediately flag it, report it to the DHS National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) or the FBI Cyber Watch (CyWatch), and give it the highest priority for enhanced mitigation. See the following links for a downloadable copy of IOCs: NCCIC conducted analysis on four malware samples and produced a Malware Analysis Report (MAR). MAR-10135536.3 – RAT/Worm examines the tactics, techniques, and procedures observed in the malware. Visit MAR-10135536.3 – HIDDEN COBRA RAT/Worm for the report and associated IOCs. DescriptionAccording to reporting of trusted third parties, HIDDEN COBRA actors have likely been using both Joanap and Brambul malware since at least 2009 to target multiple victims globally and in the United States—including the media, aerospace, financial, and critical infrastructure sectors. Users and administrators should review the information related to Joanap and Brambul from the Operation Blockbuster Destructive Malware Report [1] in conjunction with the IP addresses listed in the .csv and .stix files provided within this alert. Like many of the families of malware used by HIDDEN COBRA actors, Joanap, Brambul, and other previously reported custom malware tools, may be found on compromised network nodes. Each malware tool has different purposes and functionalities. Joanap malware is a fully functional RAT that is able to receive multiple commands, which can be issued by HIDDEN COBRA actors remotely from a command and control server. Joanap typically infects a system as a file dropped by other HIDDEN COBRA malware, which users unknowingly downloaded either when they visit sites compromised by HIDDEN COBRA actors, or when they open malicious email attachments. During analysis of the infrastructure used by Joanap malware, the U.S. Government identified 87 compromised network nodes. The countries in which the infected IP addresses are registered are as follows:
Malware often infects servers and systems without the knowledge of system users and owners. If the malware can establish persistence, it could move laterally through a victim’s network and any connected networks to infect nodes beyond those identified in this alert. Brambul malware is a brute-force authentication worm that spreads through SMB shares. SMBs enable shared access to files between users on a network. Brambul malware typically spreads by using a list of hard-coded login credentials to launch a brute-force password attack against an SMB protocol for access to a victim’s networks. Technical Details Joanap Joanap is a two-stage malware used to establish peer-to-peer communications and to manage botnets designed to enable other operations. Joanap malware provides HIDDEN COBRA actors with the ability to exfiltrate data, drop and run secondary payloads, and initialize proxy communications on a compromised Windows device. Other notable functions include
Analysis indicates the malware encodes data using Rivest Cipher 4 encryption to protect its communication with HIDDEN COBRA actors. Once installed, the malware creates a log entry within the Windows System Directory in a file named mssscardprv.ax. HIDDEN COBRA actors use this file to capture and store victims’ information such as the host IP address, host name, and the current system time. Brambul Brambul malware is a malicious Windows 32-bit SMB worm that functions as a service dynamic link library file or a portable executable file often dropped and installed onto victims’ networks by dropper malware. When executed, the malware attempts to establish contact with victim systems and IP addresses on victims’ local subnets. If successful, the application attempts to gain unauthorized access via the SMB protocol (ports 139 and 445) by launching brute-force password attacks using a list of embedded passwords. Additionally, the malware generates random IP addresses for further attacks. Analysts suspect the malware targets insecure or unsecured user accounts and spreads through poorly secured network shares. Once the malware establishes unauthorized access on the victim’s systems, it communicates information about victim’s systems to HIDDEN COBRA actors using malicious email addresses. This information includes the IP address and host name—as well as the username and password—of each victim’s system. HIDDEN COBRA actors can use this information to remotely access a compromised system via the SMB protocol. Analysis of a newer variant of Brambul malware identified the following built-in functions for remote operations:
Detection and Response This alert’s IOC files provide HIDDEN COBRA IOCs related to Joanap and Brambul. DHS and FBI recommend that network administrators review the information provided, identify whether any of the provided IP addresses fall within their organizations’ allocated IP address space, and—if found—take necessary measures to remove the malware. When reviewing network perimeter logs for the IP addresses, organizations may find instances of these IP addresses attempting to connect to their systems. Upon reviewing the traffic from these IP addresses, system owners may find some traffic relates to malicious activity and some traffic relates to legitimate activity. ImpactA successful network intrusion can have severe impacts, particularly if the compromise becomes public. Possible impacts include
Mitigation Strategies DHS recommends that users and administrators use the following best practices as preventive measures to protect their computer networks:
Response to Unauthorized Network Access Contact DHS or your local FBI office immediately. To report an intrusion and request resources for incident response or technical assistance, contact DHS NCCIC (NCCICCustomerService@hq.dhs.gov or 888-282-0870), FBI through a local field office, or FBI’s Cyber Division (CyWatch@fbi.gov or 855-292-3937). References Revision History
This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy. Categories: Security
TA18-145A: Cyber Actors Target Home and Office Routers and Networked Devices WorldwideOriginal release date: May 25, 2018 | Last revised: June 07, 2018
Systems Affected
Cybersecurity researchers have identified that foreign cyber actors have compromised hundreds of thousands of home and office routers and other networked devices worldwide [1] [2] [3]. The actors used VPNFilter malware to target small office/home office (SOHO) routers. VPNFilter malware uses modular functionality to collect intelligence, exploit local area network (LAN) devices, and block actor-configurable network traffic. Specific characteristics of VPNFilter have only been observed in the BlackEnergy malware, specifically BlackEnergy versions 2 and 3. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) recommend that owners of SOHO routers power cycle (reboot) SOHO routers and networked devices to temporarily disrupt the malware. DHS and FBI encourage SOHO router owners to report information concerning suspicious or criminal activity to their local FBI field office or the FBI’s 24/7 Cyber Watch (CyWatch). Field office contacts can be identified at www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field. CyWatch can be contacted by phone at 855-292-3937 or by email at CyWatch@fbi.gov. Each submitted report should include as much informaiton as possible, specifically the date, time, location, type of activity, number of people, the type of equipment used for the activity, the name of the submitting company or organization, and a designated point of contact. DescriptionThe size and scope of this infrastructure impacted by VPNFilter malware is significant. The persistent VPNFilter malware linked to this infrastructure targets a variety of SOHO routers and network-attached storage devices. The initial exploit vector for this malware is currently unknown. The malware uses a modular functionality on SOHO routers to collect intelligence, exploit LAN devices, and block actor-configurable network traffic. The malware can render a device inoperable, and has destructive functionality across routers, network-attached storage devices, and central processing unit (CPU) architectures running embedded Linux. The command and control mechanism implemented by the malware uses a combination of secure sockets layer (SSL) with client-side certificates for authentication and TOR protocols, complicating network traffic detection and analysis. ImpactNegative consequences of VPNFilter malware infection include:
DHS and FBI recommend that all SOHO router owners power cycle (reboot) their devices to temporarily disrupt the malware. Network device management interfaces—such as Telnet, SSH, Winbox, and HTTP—should be turned off for wide-area network (WAN) interfaces, and, when enabled, secured with strong passwords and encryption. Network devices should be upgraded to the latest available versions of firmware, which often contain patches for vulnerabilities. Rebooting affected devices will cause non-persistent portions of the malware to be removed from the system. Network defenders should ensure that first-stage malware is removed from the devices, and appropriate network-level blocking is in place prior to rebooting affected devices. This will ensure that second stage malware is not downloaded again after reboot. While the paths at each stage of the malware can vary across device platforms, processes running with the name "vpnfilter" are almost certainly instances of the second stage malware. Terminating these processes and removing associated processes and persistent files that execute the second stage malware would likely remove this malware from targeted devices. References
This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy. Categories: Security
TA18-141A: Side-Channel Vulnerability Variants 3a and 4Original release date: May 21, 2018 | Last revised: May 22, 2018
Systems Affected CPU hardware implementations OverviewOn May 21, 2018, new variants of the side-channel central processing unit (CPU) hardware vulnerabilities known as Spectre and Meltdown were publicly disclosed. These variants—known as 3A and 4—can allow an attacker to obtain access to sensitive information on affected systems. DescriptionCommon CPU hardware implementations are vulnerable to the side-channel attacks known as Spectre and Meltdown. Meltdown is a bug that "melts" the security boundaries normally enforced by the hardware, affecting desktops, laptops, and cloud computers. Spectre is a flaw that an attacker can exploit to force a CPU to reveal its data. Variant 3a is a vulnerability that may allow an attacker with local access to speculatively read system parameters via side-channel analysis and obtain sensitive information. Variant 4 is a vulnerability that exploits “speculative bypass.” When exploited, Variant 4 could allow an attacker to read older memory values in a CPU’s stack or other memory locations. While implementation is complex, this side-channel vulnerability could allow less privileged code to
Corresponding CVEs for Side-Channel Variants 1, 2, 3, 3a, and 4 are found below:
Side-Channel Vulnerability Variants 3a and 4 may allow an attacker to obtain access to sensitive information on affected systems. Solution MitigationNCCIC recommends users and administrators
The following table contains links to advisories and patches published in response to the vulnerabilities. This table will be updated as information becomes available. Link to Vendor InformationDate AddedAMDMay 21, 2018ARMMay 21, 2018IntelMay 22, 2018MicrosoftMay 21, 2018RedhatMay 21, 2018 References
This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy. Categories: Security
Threat Hunting & Adversary Emulation: The HELK vs APTSimulator - Part 2, (Fri, Apr 6th)Categories: Security
ISC Stormcast For Friday, April 6th 2018 https://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail.html?id=5943, (Fri, Apr 6th)Categories: Security
&#xa;Threat Hunting & Adversary Emulation: The HELK vs APTSimulator - Part 1, (Thu, Apr 5th)Categories: Security
ISC Stormcast For Thursday, April 5th 2018 https://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail.html?id=5941, (Thu, Apr 5th)Categories: Security
ISC/DShield Website TLS Updates, (Wed, Apr 4th)On Thursday, we will change our TLS certificate to one issued by Letsencrypt. In the past, we used normal "commercial" certificates. Until a few months ago, we used HTTP Public Key Pinning. It appears that key pinning is no longer going to be supported by browsers, so we decided to remove this feature, which enabled us to use Letsencrypt. We removed the key pinning header a while ago, and browsers should no longer "pin" for our sites. But in case you are experiencing problems connecting to this site later this week, please let us know. You may still be able to connect to www.dshield.org if you can not connect to isc.sans.edu.
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SANS Security Awareness Published its April "Ouch!" Newsletter sans.org/u/Crt , (Wed, Apr 4th)---
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A Suspicious Use of certutil.exe, (Wed, Apr 4th)The Microsoft operating system is full of command line tools that help to perform administrative tasks. Some can be easily installed, like the SysInternal suite[1] and psexec.exe, others are builtin in Windows and available to everybody. The presence of calls to such tools can help to detect suspicious behaviours. Why reinvent the wheel, if a tool can achieve what you need? I recently upgraded my hunting rules on VirusTotal to collect samples that are (ab)using the "certutil.exe" tool. The purpose of this tool is to dump and display certification authority (CA) information, manage certificates and keys. This is a command line tool that accepts a lot of parameters [2]. A classic use of certutil.exe is to easily process Base64 encoded data:
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