Recently we talked a lot about attacks exploiting Java deserialization vulnerabilties in systems like Apache SOLR and WebLogic. Most of these attacks targeted Linux/Unix systems. But recently, I am seeing more attacks that target windows. For example:
One advantage of static analysis over dynamic analysis, is that it can reveal more information than dynamic analysis. In the last analysis example of a phishing PDF, we uncovered more URLs via static analysis.
Here is an animated GIF showing the URLs in the PDF I analyzed yesterday:
A reader wanted to know why the phishing PDF he received contained multiple and different links, according to my pdf tools, but would only show the same URL when he hovered over the links in Adobe Reader.
The CIS Controls serve as a “prioritized set of actions to protect your organization and data from known cyber attack vectors.”. Embraced by several organizations as outlined in the Case Studies section, significant improvements to their cyber security programs are listed and can serve as an inspiration to consider this approach to effective cyber defense.
I’m sure virtually all of our readers are aware of the patch that has been released for Drupal yesterday. In case you’ve been on a remote island, all versions of Drupal (6, 7 and 8) were vulnerable to a critical security vulnerability that allows an attacker remote code execution.
Scanning assets for known vulnerabilities is a mandatory process in many organisations. This topic comes in the third position of the CIS Top-20. The major issue with a vulnerability scanning process is not on the technical side but more on the process side. Indeed, the selection of the tool and its deployment is not very complicated (well, in not too complex environments, to be honest): Buya solution or build a solution based on free tools, define the scope, schedule the scan and it’s done. Then start the real problem: How to handle the thousands of vulnerabilities reported by the tool? Yes, be sure that you’ll be flooded by alerts like this:
Original release date: March 27, 2018 | Last revised: March 28, 2018
According to information derived from FBI investigations, malicious cyber actors are increasingly using a style of brute force attack known as password spraying against organizations in the United States and abroad.
On February 2018, the Department of Justice in the Southern District of New York, indicted nine Iranian nationals, who were associated with the Mabna Institute, for computer intrusion offenses related to activity described in this report. The techniques and activity described herein, while characteristic of Mabna actors, are not limited solely to use by this group.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) are releasing this Alert to provide further information on this activity.Description
In a traditional brute-force attack, a malicious actor attempts to gain unauthorized access to a single account by guessing the password. This can quickly result in a targeted account getting locked-out, as commonly used account-lockout policies allow three to five bad attempts during a set period of time. During a password-spray attack (also known as the “low-and-slow” method), the malicious actor attempts a single password against many accounts before moving on to attempt a second password, and so on. This technique allows the actor to remain undetected by avoiding rapid or frequent account lockouts.
Password spray campaigns typically target single sign-on (SSO) and cloud-based applications utilizing federated authentication protocols. An actor may target this specific protocol because federated authentication can help mask malicious traffic. Additionally, by targeting SSO applications, malicious actors hope to maximize access to intellectual property during a successful compromise.
Email applications are also targeted. In those instances, malicious actors would have the ability to utilize inbox synchronization to (1) obtain unauthorized access to the organization's email directly from the cloud, (2) subsequently download user mail to locally stored email files, (3) identify the entire company’s email address list, and/or (4) surreptitiously implements inbox rules for the forwarding of sent and received messages.Technical Details
Traditional tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for conducting the password-spray attacks are as follows:
Indicators of a password spray attack include:
A successful network intrusion can have severe impacts, particularly if the compromise becomes public and sensitive information is exposed. Possible impacts include:
To help deter this style of attack, the following steps should be taken:
The FBI encourages recipients of this document to report information concerning suspicious or criminal activity to their local FBI field office or the FBI’s 24/7 Cyber Watch (CyWatch). Field office contacts can be identified at www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field. CyWatch can be contacted by phone at (855) 292-3937 or by e-mail at CyWatch@ic.fbi.gov. When available, each report submitted should include the date, time, location, type of activity, number of people, and type of equipment used for the activity, the name of the submitting company or organization, and a designated point of contact. Press inquiries should be directed to the FBI’s national Press Office at email@example.com or (202) 324-3691.References
Smartphones today carry an unbelievable amount of sensitive information. As absolutely everything is going mobile these days, we have to pay special attention on security of mobile applications, specifically data at rest (data stored on a mobile device) and data in transit (data transferred to the target server).
Last weekend, I caught on VirusTotal a trojan disguised as Windows IRC bot. It was detected thanks to my ‘psexec’ hunting rule which looks definitively an interesting keyword (see my previous diary). I detected the first occurrence on 2018-03-24 15:48:00 UTC. The file was submitted for the first time from the US. The strange fact is that the initial file has already a goods code on VT (55/67) and is detected by most of the classic antivirus tools.
Over the past two weeks, I have noticed several attempts against my honeypot looking to exploit CVE-2017-5638 Apache Struts2 vulnerability that look very similar to this python script. Today alone I recorded 57 attempts against port 80, 8080 and 443. T format of the queries I have observed over the past two weeks contain one of these two requests:
"Error 19874: You must have Office Professional Edition to read this content, please upgrade your licence.", (Sat, Mar 24th)
I was sent a document that could (supposedly) only be read with Office Professional. Of course, this was a malicious document (MD5 151a561d41eb3e960676b293e726d8f3) with macros.